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We  use  a  large  panel  data,  covering  6  semesters,  496  undergraduate  courses  related  to  101 
instructors  and  89  disciplines.  This  allows  treating  adequately  unobserved  heterogeneity.  We  use  a 
random-effects model estimated with feasible generalized least squares to find the factors that affect the 
student  evaluation  of  teaching  (SET)  scores,  including  time-invariant  instructors’  characteristics.  Our 
empirical findings are: (i) controlling for the instructor’s status as full-time or part-time professor, the 
quality of his research affects positively the SET score; (ii) participating in training programs, designed to 
improve the quality of teaching, did  not increase the  SET scores; (iii) instructors can ‘buy’ a better 
evaluation by inflating students’ grade; (ii) the class size affects negatively the SET score; (iv) instructors 
with  more  experience  are  better  evaluated,  but  these  gains  reduce  over  time.  Finally,  there  are  no 
significant changes in the rankings overall when we adjust the SET score to eliminate either the possible 
manipulation by the instructor or the effects of variables beyond his control. Despite some dramatic 
changes in some instructors’ positions, they are not statistically significant.  
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1.  Introduction 
In several universities, it is common that students evaluate their professors in the 
end  of  the  courses
1.  The  results  of  the  student  evaluation  of  teaching  (SET)  are 
considered as an instrument to assess the quality of an instructor’s teaching and are used 
by  these  institutions  for  purposes  of  promotion  of  the  instructors
2.  Reflecting  the 
importance  of  this  topic  for  professors  and  universities’  managers,  there  is  a  vast 
literature on the factors that affect the SET scores
3. 
This  paper  takes  advantage  of  a  large  panel  data  with  six  semesters  for  the 
period from the second semester of 2005 to the first semester of 2008, encompassing 
496 undergraduate courses taught by 101 instructors in 89 different disciplines. We use 
a random effects model estimated with feasible generalized least squares to examine the 
effects  of  instructor-specific  time-invariant  characteristics  as  well  as  to  control  for 
unobservable  characteristics  of  individual  instructors.  In  these  regards,  the  closest 
papers to this one in the literature are McPherson (2006) and McPherson et al. (2007). 
The main novelties of this paper are the following. First, we add one important control 
variable in the analysis: the quality of the instructor’s research. To our knowledge this is 
the first time that the possible effect of this variable is taken into consideration. We are 
able to check if the credit that students give to the better knowledge in the field by better 
researchers more than compensate the fact that teaching and research are both time-
consuming activities and there is a trade-off between them. Second, we check if the fact 
that  instructors  take  part  in  training  programs,  designed  to  improve  the  quality  of 
teaching, are capable of increasing the SET scores.  
We find robust empirical evidence that some course’s, instructor’s and student’s 
characteristics can affect the SET scores. When controlling for the instructor’s status as 
full-time or part-time professor and instructor’s schooling (master or PhD degree), the 
quality of his research affects positively the SET score. This result suggests that the 
                                                           
1 For example, Becker and Watts (1999) show that this is the case for most departments of economics in 
the United States. 
2 Many studies have analyzed if higher SET scores in fact mean that the teaching quality is greater. The 
results are mixed. See, for example, Soper (1973) and Gramlich and Greenlee (1993).  
3 For a review of the literature, see McPherson et al. (2007). 3 
 
trade-off  between  the  time  dedicated  to  research  and  teaching  activities  could  be 
compensated by the fact that better researchers may be seen by the students as better 
instructors, possibly because they are more likely to have more investment in human 
capital and be perceived as having a better control of the subject taught. The coefficients 
of the variables related to the instructor training programs though were not significant. 
Other results found in the literature are also obtained here: instructors seem to be able to 
‘buy’ a better evaluation by inflating student’s grade, the class size affects negatively 
the SET score and instructors with more experience are better evaluated, but these gains 
reduce over time.  
Furthermore, we construct different instructors’ rankings by adjusting the SET 
scores, in order to eliminate either the possible manipulation by the instructor through 
grade inflation or the  effects of variables beyond the instructor’s control. Although, 
there are no significant changes in the rankings overall, there are some dramatic changes 
in the some instructors’ positions. Nonetheless, when constructing the 95% percentage 
confidence interval of the predicted SET scores, we find that these changes are not 
statistically significant. 
This paper has five sections including this introduction. In the next section, we 
present  the  data  and  the  methodology  employed  in  the  analysis.  The  results  are 
presented  and  discussed  in  section  3.  In  section  4,  we  analyze  how  the  instructors’ 
ranking  changes  when  we  adjust  the  SET  scores  in  order  to  eliminate  either  the 
possibility  of  instructor’s  manipulation  through  grade  inflation  or  the  effects  of 
variables beyond the instructor’s control. The last section concludes. 
2.  Methodology and Data 
We obtained the data from the Insper’s (Institute of Education and Research) 
Academic Records Office. It is interesting to remark that 89.1% and 90.1% of all HEI 
are private, respectively, in the State of Sao Paulo and in Brazil. In that regard, our data 
set is representative of that group and the results should be broadly generalized. The 
data covered six semesters for the period from the second semester of 2005 to the first 
semester of 2008. It comprises 496 undergraduate courses offered during this period, 
taught by 101 different instructors. 63 observations were excluded from the sample, or 
12,7%  of  the  total,  for  three  reasons:  (i)  the  instructor  taught  only  one  time  at  the 
institution (32 observations in original sample), (ii) the fraction of students enrolled in 4 
 
the class that answer the SET form was equal to 0% (3 observations) or greater than 
100%  (14  observations)  and  (iii)  the  number  of  students  enrolled  in  the  class  was 
smaller than 12 (25 observations). 
There are three important characteristics of the data. The first is the fact that, in 
Brazil, students choose the area they want to obtain the bachelor degree before they are 
accepted as a student in a HEI, either economics or business at Insper. The second is 
that Insper’s students in each field (business or economics) must take the same courses 
in the first three of the four years of courses necessary to obtain the degree. Hence, in 
the first three years, they cannot choose either the instructor or the class, that is, they 
have  to  take  the  options  offered.  In  the  last  year,  students  can  select  different 
course/instructor from the pool of offered elective disciplines. We conducted an F test to 
check  if  it  is  appropriate  to  pool  together  mandatory  and  elective  courses
4.  The  F-
statistic is 15.02 (15 degrees of freedom) which is not significant at the usual level of 
significance. It indicates that it is valid to pool the two groups of courses. Therefore, we 
conduct the empirical analysis combining data from both types of courses. The third 
characteristic is that, in the first three semesters, the courses are the same for students in 
the business or economics field and they can be offered as joint courses. In this case, 
students can not choose the instructor/class but are allocated by the institution, which 
mix economic and business students. 
The Insper hires individuals other than the instructors to distribute SET forms 
without  announcement  beforehand  two  times  during  the  semester.  They  occur  right 
before the mid-term and final exams. In our analysis, we use only the results obtained in 
the last evaluation. In this research, we use two dependent variables. The first one is the 
average of all answers in the SET form (hereafter referred as EVAL1), which is the 
variable  used  by  the  institution  to  evaluate  the  quality  of  instructor’s  teaching  for 
purposes of promotion. EVAL1 ranges from 1 to 4, where a higher value indicates a 
better  evaluation.  The  average  score  for  EVAL1  for  all  courses  was  3.32  and  the 
minimum  and  maximum  value  were,  respectively,  1.9  and  3.9.  In  Table  1  of  the 
appendix, we present the descriptive statistics. 
The second dependent variable (EVAL2) is calculated based on the answer to 
the following question, which is not used in the computation of EVAL1: “Considering 
                                                           
4 Following McPheerson et al. (2007), we tested the equality of parameters in mandatory and elective 
disciplines according with the specification (1) in table 2 of the appendix. 5 
 
the overall course and the instructor’s performance, would you recommend this course 
with this instructor to a colleague?” The possible answers are no (value 1) or yes (value 
2). EVAL2 is the average response and it obviously ranges from 1 to 2, where the closer 
is to 2 the better is the evaluation. The average value for EVAL2 for all courses was 
1.84 and the minimum and maximum value were, respectively, 1.08 and 2. 
Following the literature, we consider three groups of variables that can affect the 
SET  score.  They  are  related  to  the  characteristics  of  the  students,  courses  and 
instructors. 
With  respect  to  the  instructor’s  characteristics,  we  use  several  explanatory 
variables. The first one is the quality of his research (QRES). This variable is measured 
in the following way. Each publication in a refereed journal receives a certain number 
of points, depending on the quality of the publication, defined by the Brazilian public 
institution CAPES, which belongs to the Brazilian Ministry of Education. QRES ranges 
from 0 to 159 and the average value is 13.2. The sign of its coefficient is unclear. On the 
one hand, the better the researcher is, the more likely he is updated in terms of his 
knowledge of the current state of the discipline. Students should give credit to this and 
evaluate better those instructors. On the other hand, teaching and research are both time-
consuming  activities  and  there  exists  a  clear  trade-off  between  them.  A  greater 
dedication  to  research  may  preclude  the  necessary  time  to  the  course’s  preparation, 
leading to a worse students’ evaluation. We also check if the squared QRES affects the 
SET score. 
The second and third variables are related to instructor training programs. One is 
a dummy variable (CPCL) equal to 1 if the instructor had taken part in the Colloquium 
on Participant-Centered Learning at the Harvard Business School
5 and 0 otherwise. This 
training program aims to help instructors to improve their effectiveness by  learning 
from their teaching. The expected sign of this variable is positive as instructors learn 
new techniques and ways to improve their teaching. 17.6% of all instructors at Insper 
had taken part in this program. Another dummy variable is (PAAP) which is equal to 1 
if the instructor had taken part in the PAAP program
6 and 0 otherwise. The PAAP 
program  is  one  in  which  an  instructor  attends  another  instructor’s  class  with  the 
objective to identify problems, provide recommendations and suggestions in order to 
                                                           
5 For more details on this program, see http://www.exed.hbs.edu/programs/gcpcl/. 
6 PAAP stands for “professor attending another professor’s class” in Portuguese. 6 
 
improve the teaching quality. Therefore, the expected sign of this variable is positive. 
20.8% of all instructors had participated in this program.  
We also control for the instructor’s schooling. A dummy variable (PHD) is equal 
to  1  if the  instructor  has  a  PhD  degree  and  0  otherwise.  The  expected  sign  of  this 
variable  is  positive  as  the  instructor’s  knowledge  and  human  capital  increase  with 
education. 76.2% of all instructors at Insper have a PhD degree. The others either have a 
master degree or a professional degree such as an MBA. 
Another control variable is a dummy (GENDER) equal to 1 to male instructors 
and 0 otherwise. 82.2% of all instructors are male. It may exists some gender bias in the 
evaluation process, for example, due to discrimination or a different perception by the 
students  of  male  vis-à-vis  female  instructor
7,  which  makes  unclear  the  sign  of  its 
coefficient.    Another  dummy  variable  is  (FULL),  which  is  equal  to  1  or  0  if  the 
instructor is, respectively, a full-time or part-time professor. The fraction of full-time 
professors is 27%. The sign of its coefficient is uncertain. Both types of instructors have 
other responsibilities rather than teaching. 
One  additional  explanatory  variable  is  the  number  of  semesters  teaching  at 
Insper (EXP). The average number is equal to 3.6. This variable is a proxy for teaching 
experience, as we do not have the information of how long the instructor teaches at 
other institutions. The expected sign of its coefficient is positive as more experience in 
the classroom contributes to an increase in the teaching quality. In particular, as this 
variable counts only the number of semesters teaching at Insper, it may capture the 
instructor’s  adaptability  to  the  institution’s  environment  and  student  body.  We  also 
check if this learning gain reduces over time by the introduction of the EXP squared. 
The  last  variable  is  the  instructor’s  age  (AGE).  The  average  age  is  39.6  years  old. 
Controlling  for  experience,  the  expected  sign  of  its  coefficient  is  negative  due  to 
different  reasons:  human  capital  depreciation,  students’  bias  in  favor  of  younger 
instructors  and  involvement  in  other  activities  rather  than  teaching  such  as 
administrative duties in the case of full-time professors
8. We also check if the AGE 
squared is significant. 
With  respect  to  the  students’  characteristics  in  each  class,  we  use  three 
explanatory variables. The first one is the actual average grade (GRADE). It ranges 
                                                           
7 Hamermesh and Parker (2005) indicate that beauty perception affects the SET score and its effect differs 
by instructor gender. 
8 See discussion in McPherson et al. (2007). 7 
 
from 0 to 10 and its average score is 6.44, with minimum 2 and maximum 8.7. This 
variable may test the possibility that instructors can “buy” a better evaluation by giving 
higher grades
9. Under this possibility, its coefficient is expected to be positive. As we 
do not have the average expected grade, which is more frequently used in the literature, 
we make the hypothesis that students have rational expectations and can foresight their 
grades
10. The second variable is the fraction of students enrolled in class that answer the 
SET form (PRESP). The average value of PRESP is 60.8%. The expected sign of its 
coefficient is not clear. A high percentage of response may lead to lower SET scores 
either because the students are poorly satisfied with the instructors’ performance and 
want to show their lack of appreciation or because a high fraction of low performing 
students answer the evaluation. The reverse may occur if a high percentage of response 
is indicative of student interest. The third variable is the fraction of female students in 
class (PFEM). The average value of PFEM is 27.9%. Again, the sign of its coefficient is 
unclear. The gender composition may affect the SET scores if male and female students 
have different standards when evaluating their instructors.  
With  respect  to  the  courses’  characteristics,  we  use  several  explanatory 
variables. The first one is the number of students enrolled in class at the beginning of 
the semester (CSIZE). The sign of its coefficient is likely to be negative as the instructor 
provides less attention to any particular student the greater the class size and should be 
“penalized” by the students in the SET evaluation. CSIZE ranges from 13 to 115, and its 
average value is 56.5. Then, we use a dummy variable (MAND) equal to 1 if the course 
is mandatory and 0 otherwise. The percentage of mandatory courses in the sample is 
84.5%.  One should expect instructors teaching elective courses to be better evaluated 
by the students as the latter had the option to choose the course/instructor. Finally, we 
use a set of dummy variables to indicate whether the course belongs to the business 
degree (BUS) (21.9% of the total), to the economics degree (ECON) (17.8% of the 
total) or is a joint one (JOINT) (60.3%). The sign of their coefficients are unclear. The 
composition of the student body in class may affect the SET scores if economics and 
business students have different standards when evaluating their instructors. 
                                                           
9 This effect is of particular interest in the literature. See survey about this topic in McPherson et al. 
(2007). 
10 Isely and Sing (2005) consider the relevant variable the difference between expected grade and the 
grades that students are used to receive. McPherson et al. (2007) argues that it is more appropriate to use 
the expected grade.  8 
 
Finally, it is important to point out that there are instructors who taught during 
the period analyzed more than one course in the same semester. This fact precludes the 
use of panel data techniques when using the instructor as the unity of analysis. In order 
to  circumvent  this  problem,  we  consider  the  pair  instructor/course  as  the  unit  of 
analysis.  When  the  unity  instructor/course  occurred  more  than  once  in  the  same 
semester,  the  information  related  to  this  unity  of  observation  was  averaged.  When 
averaged,  the  number  of  observations  is  equal  to  363  and  there  are  130  pairs 
instructor/course. 
Hence, we have a panel data and we consider two types of models, either a 
fixed-effect  or  a  random-effects  one.  Both  models  control  for  the  unobservable 
characteristics of the pairs instructor/course and time (from the 2
nd semester of 2005 
until 1
st the semester of 2008). We test which model is the most appropriate. Hausman 
test  for  the  sample  indicates  that  the  unobserved  instructors’  heterogeneity  can  be 
assumed to be uncorrelated with the explanatory variables, mentioned above, included 
in  the  analysis.  The  chi-square  statistic  is  8.82  (17  degrees  of  freedom),  which  is 
insignificant at any conventional level11. Therefore, we concentrate the analysis in the 
results when the random-effects model is used, which is characterized by the following 
formulation: 
Yijt = α + ui + γt + Xijtβ + εijt,                           
where: Yijt is the dependent variable (EVAL1 or EVAL2) of instructor ‘i’ in course ‘j’ in 
semester ‘t’; α is a constant; ui is the pair instructor/course specific effect; γt is the 
semester-specific  effect;  Xijt  is  a  vector  that  includes  all  the  explanatory  variables 
mentioned above; β is a vector with the coefficients of interest; and εijt is the error term 
and it is assumed to be well-behaved.  
3.  Results 
In this section, we present the evidence of which factors affect the SET score. 
Table 2 in the appendix reports the estimation results using different specifications of 
the model. In column 1, we use the variable EVAL1 as the dependent variable and all 
the  explanatory  variables  mentioned  in  the  previous  section,  without  the  quadratic 
terms. 
                                                           
11 We have conducted the test following the specification (1) in table 2 of the appendix. 9 
 
The results in column 1 indicate the following. With respect to the students’ 
characteristics, there is only one that affects EVAL1: the GRADE. Hence, as expected, 
there  is  evidence  that  an  instructor  can  “buy”  a  better  evaluation  by  inflating  the 
students’ grade. The coefficient of the variable GRADE is positive and significantly 
different from zero, but small. One point increase in GRADE in the 0-10 scale leads to 
an  increase  in  the  SET  scores  of  0.09  point.  To  give  a  better  idea  of  this  impact, 
consider two identical average classes with the exception of their average grades: one 
has  the  average  grade  of  all  classes
12  (6.47)  and  another  has  a  grade  one  standard 
deviation lower (5.48). The instructor’s SET score in latter would be 2.7% smaller than 
the former. 
There is no indication that male and female students have different standards 
when evaluating instructors, as the coefficient of the variable PFEM is not statistically 
different from zero. Finally, the fraction of students enrolled in the class that answer the 
SET form (PRESP) also is not relevant to explain the dependent variable EVAL1. 
With respect to the courses’ characteristics, the results are the following. The 
greater the number of students in class, the lower is the SET grade. In other words, the 
sign of the CSIZE’s coefficient is negative and significantly different from zero. An 
additional student in class reduces the SET score in 0.003 point. To understand this 
effect better, consider two identical average classes with the exception of their sizes: 
one has 54.7 students in class (average number for all classes) and another has one 
standard deviation higher (75.64 students). The instructor’s SET score in latter would be 
2% bigger than the former.  
There is no difference in terms of evaluation by the students if the course is 
mandatory or elective. The coefficient of the dummy variable MAND is not statistically 
different from zero. This is a surprising result as one should expect students to evaluate 
better an instructor that he can choose. Finally, the coefficient of the dummy variable 
JOINT is positive and significantly different from zero. It indicates that the composition 
of the student body affects the SET score. In particular, classes with economics and 
business  students  evaluate  better  the  instructors  relatively  to  classes  with  only 
economics students.  
                                                           
12 The values in these comparisons are related to the adjusted sample for the pair instructor/course. 10 
 
With  respect  to  the  instructors’  characteristics,  some  variables  are  not 
statistically significant in the regression in column 1. The first one is the GENDER 
variable.  There  is  no  indication  of  discrimination  or  difference  in  perception  with 
respect to the instructor’s gender by the students. The second one is the status as full-
time professor or the dummy variable FULL. This result is not surprising given that 
both types of instructors have other duties rather than teaching that should interfere in 
the same way their time allocation to class preparation. The coefficients of the variables 
AGE and PhD are not statistically significant, as their expected signs were, respectively, 
negative and positive, as discussed in the previous section.  
The coefficients of the two variables related to the training programs (PAAP and 
CPCL) are also not significantly different from zero. That is, there is no indication that 
students evaluate better the instructors who have passed by these two types of training 
programs. These are surprising results, as indicated by the discussion in the previous 
section. It is important to point out that, as the link between quality of teaching and SET 
scores is not clear, these results do not necessarily indicate that these programs are not 
capable of improving the quality of the instructors’ class. 
Two variables related to the instructors’ characteristics affect the SET scores. As 
expected, the longer the instructors’ experience teaching at Insper, the greater is their 
evaluations.  In  other  words,  the  coefficient  of  the  variable  EXP  is  positive  and 
significantly  different  from  zero.  One  additional  semester  of  experience  leads  to  an 
increase in the evaluation by 0.03 point. An example illustrates this effect. Consider two 
classes  identical  in  all  aspects  but  the  instructors’  experience.  In  the  first  one,  the 
instructor has 3.4 semesters of experience, the average of all classes. In the second one, 
the instructor has one standard deviation lower than the average (0.9 semester). The 
instructor’s SET score in former and the latter would be, respectively, equal to 3.3 and 
3.2 points. 
Finally, the quality of the instructor’s research affects positively his SET score, 
as the sign of the coefficient of the variable QRES is positive and significantly different 
from zero. One additional point in QRES increases the instructor’s evaluation by 0.001 
points. To give a better idea of this result, consider again two average classes with the 
same characteristics but the instructors’ research quality. In the first class, one instructor 
has the average point in research, 14.2 points. In the second class, another instructor has 11 
 
one standard deviation higher points of research, or 39.7 points. The instructor’s SET 
score in latter would be 0.9% bigger than the former. This result suggests that the trade-
off between research and teaching activities, discussed in the previous section, could be 
compensated by the fact that better researchers may be seen by the students as better 
instructors. Possibly because they are more likely to have more investment in human 
capital and be perceived as having a better control of the subject taught. 
In  column  2  in  Table  2,  we  present  a  different  specification  of  the  random-
effects model. It differs from the first column by the fact that there is one additional 
explanatory variable. It is the quadratic term of the variable EXP, which is negative and 
significantly different from zero.  The coefficient of the variable EXP remains positive 
and significant. In other words, the first and second derivatives of the EVAL1 with 
respect to EXP are, respectively, positive and negative. Combining these two results, 
the  empirical  evidence  suggests  that  instructors  with  more  experience  are  better 
evaluated by the students but these gains reduce over time. The coefficients of the other 
variables are basically the same. 
We tried some different specifications to the model 2. First, we introduced the 
quadratic terms of the variables CSIZE, AGE and QRES, but their coefficients were not 
significantly  different  from  zero.  Second,  we  included  an  interaction  term  between 
GENDER  and  PFEM  to  check  if  classes  with  a  higher  fraction  of  female  students 
evaluate female instructors differently. We found no evidence of this effect. Third, as 
AGE  and  EXP  are  somewhat  correlated,  we  run  regressions  with  each  variable 
separately but the results do not change
13.    
Finally,  in  column  3  in  Table  2,  we  report  the  results  using  the  dependent 
variable EVAL2, using the same explanatory variables as in column 2. It is interesting 
to note that the results are quite robust and qualitatively the same in comparison with 
column 2, with one exception. In this new formulation, the coefficient of the dummy 
variable  JOINT  is  not  statistically  different  from  zero.  Quantitatively  speaking,  the 
results are not very different. The only remarkable differences are that the coefficients 
of the variables CSIZE and GRADE are roughly two times greater when the dependent 
variable is EVAL1.  
                                                           
13 These results of these different specifications are available from the authors under request. 12 
 
4.  Rankings 
The analysis in the previous section indicates that several factors affect the SET 
scores. Among these factors are variables under the control of the instructor, such as 
GRADE, or not, such as EXP and CSIZE. As a consequence, an instructor can receive a 
better  evaluation  either  by  manipulating  his  score  through  grade  inflation  or  by  the 
effects of variables that are beyond his control. In both cases, comparison of instructors 
without  controlling  for  these  possibilities  may  not  be  fair.  In  order  to  take  into 
consideration these possibilities and adjust the SET scores accordingly, we construct 
three different rankings
14. They are reported in Table 3. 
The benchmark case (ranking 1) is in column 1. To obtain this first ranking, we 
do the following. We obtain the predicted SET score for each instructor for every time 
that he teaches a course by calculating the regression fitted value, using the estimated 
coefficients  in  column  2  in  Table  2  and  given  the  explanatory  variables  for  each 
instructor.  Note  that  this  predicted  value  is  not  influenced  by  the  instructor-specific 
random effects. The results reported are the average fitted values over all semesters.  
The second ranking is reported in column 2 in Table 3. In this one, the procedure 
is the same as the one used to produce the benchmark case, with one exception. We 
replace the actual value of the explanatory variable GRADE of each instructor every 
time he teaches a course by the mean GRADE of the sample. Again, the reported results 
are the average fitted values over all semesters. By adjusting the ranking in this way, we 
eliminate  the  effects  on  the  SET  score  of  possible  manipulation  by  the  instructor 
through the grade inflation. 
Comparison  between  rankings  1  and  2  indicates  that  they  are  very  similar. 
Despite of being able to “buy” higher scores by inflating students’ grade, instructors in 
general are not able to change dramatically their positions in the ranking. The most 
significant  change  occurred  with  instructor  I59  that  moved  from  position  59  in  the 
benchmark ranking to position 52 in ranking 2. In addition, three instructors moved 
down  5  positions  (instructors  I14,  I15  and  I37)  and  one  instructor  moved  up  five 
positions (instructor I21). 
                                                           
14 For similar adjustments in the literature, see Mason et al. (1995) and McPherson (2006). 13 
 
The third ranking is reported in column 3 in Table 3. Again, they are constructed 
in the same way as the benchmark case but with two exceptions. For each instructor and 
every  time  he  teaches  a  course,  we  replace  the  actual  values  of  two  explanatory 
variables in the regression, CSIZE and EXP, by their respectively average values in the 
sample. The new ranking is formed by the average fitted values over all semesters. With 
these  two  adjustments,  we  basically  eliminate  the  effects  of  variables  beyond  the 
instructor’s control. 
Rankings 1 and 3 have their similarities. For example, nine out of the ten top 
instructors in ranking 1 are also in the top ten positions in ranking 2. However, the 
differences between rankings 1 and 3 are greater than the ones between rankings 1 and 
2. One indicator illustrates this fact. The sum of the absolute changes in positions of all 
instructors when one compares rankings 1 and 2 is equal to 94. The same number is 
equal to 290 when the comparison is made between rankings 1 and 3. In fact, there are 
some dramatic changes in some instructors’ positions in ranking 3 vis-à-vis ranking 1. 
For example, instructor I34 moves down 23 positions when one eliminates the effects of 
the variables CSIZE and EXP, which are not in his control. In contrast, instructors I28 
and I41 move up 13 positions. 
The  results  presented  in  Table  4  complements  the  analysis  of  the  adjusted 
rankings. It shows the predicted SET scores for all instructors in all three rankings with 
their respective 95% confidence interval. It is interesting to pinpoint two conclusions 
that emerge from these numbers. The first one is that, despite the changes in positions in 
ranking 2 and in particular in ranking 3 with respect to ranking 1, the SET scores in all 
three rankings for all instructors are not statistically different. In other words, one can 
not say that the rankings 2 and 3 are, in fact, statistically different from ranking 1
15.  
The last point we want to address is the following. Suppose that an institution 
establishes a threshold SET score, say 3.4
16, such that instructors with scores greater or 
equal than this number are considered as having performed an outstanding job with 
important influences in their promotion status. A comparison of the predicted scores in 
rankings 1 and 2 suggests the following. No instructor who receives a score below 3.4 
                                                           
15 We also calculated two different rankings, respectively, controlling for the variables CSIZE and EXP. 
They are also not statistically different from ranking 1. 
  
16 This value used to be the threshold value at Insper. 
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in ranking 1 (instructors I23 to I69) would pass this threshold in ranking 2, when the 
possibility of manipulating the score through grade inflation is taken into account and 
eliminated. At the same time, no instructor who receives a score above 3.4 in ranking 1 
(instructors I1 to I23) would have his score reduced to a level below to this threshold in 
ranking 2.  
However, there are instructors with predicted scores below 3.4 (from instructor 
I23 with 3.39 to instructor I45 with 3.24 in ranking 2 in Table 4) whose value is not 
statistically different from 3.4, using the 95% confidence interval. Therefore, the use of 
the threshold 3.4 as the basis for promotion, without considering adjustments, should be 
used with cautious. 
5.  Conclusions 
 
We estimated the factors that affect the SET scores, using a large panel data and 
a  random-effects  model  in  which  it  was  possible  to  control  for  unobserved 
characteristics of the instructors as well as time-invariant ones. The results indicate that 
several  variables  influence  the  evaluation.  They  also  seem  robust  to  different 
specifications of the model. 
One new result is that, controlling for the instructor’s status as full-time or part-
time professor, the quality of his research affects positively and significantly the SET 
score. This result suggests that better researchers are perceived by the students as being 
better instructors, possibly because they are more likely to have more investments in 
human  capital  and  a  better  control  of  the  subject  taught.  This  effect  more  than 
compensates the one related to the fact that there is a trade-off between teaching and 
research activities as both are time-consuming ones. 
Another  new  result  in  the  literature  is  the  evidence  that  instructors  who 
participated in training programs, designed to improve the quality of teaching, do not 
receive higher SET scores. One cannot easily conclude from these results that these 
programs are not capable of improving the quality of the instructors’ class. The reason 
is that the link between quality and effectiveness of teaching and SET scores are not 
clear. 
There is evidence that an instructor can ‘buy’ a better evaluation by inflating 
students’ grade, though the effect is not strong. As expected, the greater the number of 
students in class, the lower is the SET score. Moreover, instructors with more semesters 15 
 
of experience teaching at the institution are better evaluated by the students but these 
gains reduce over time. In addition, it is somehow surprising that the instructor’s age 
and schooling do not affect the way students evaluate him.  
We  construct  different  instructors’  rankings  by  adjusting  the  SET  scores,  in 
order  to  eliminate  either  the  possible  manipulation  by  the  instructor  through  grade 
inflation or the effects of variables beyond the instructor’s control. Although, there are 
no significant changes in the rankings overall, there are some dramatic changes in the 
some  instructors’  positions.  Nonetheless,  when  constructing  the  95%  percentage 
confidence interval of the predicted SET scores, we find that these changes are not 
statistically significant. Finally, one important policy implication is that the use of a 
given threshold SET score as the basis for promotion, without considering adjustments, 






Table 1: Descriptive statistics 
 
Variable  Obs  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max 
SET variables 
EVAL1  433  3.3  0.3  1.9  3.9 
EVAL2  433  1.8  0.2  1.1  2.0 
Student's characteristics 
GRADE  433  6.4  1.0  2.0  8.7 
PRESP  433  60.8%  16.4%  8.0%  93.6% 
PFEM  433  27.9%  7.9%  6.8%  52.5% 
Courses' characteristics 
CSIZE  433  56.5  20.7  13.0  115.0 
MAND  433  84.5%  36.2%  0.0%  100.0% 
BUS  433  21.9%  41.4%  0.0%  100.0% 
ECON  433  17.8%  38.3%  0.0%  100.0% 
JOINT  433  60.3%  49.0%  0.0%  100.0% 
Instructors' characteristics 
GENDER  433  82.2%  38.3%  0.0%  100.0% 
FULL  433  27.0%  44.5%  0.0%  100.0% 
EXP  433  3.6  2.4  0.0  14.4 
AGE  433  39.6  8.0  24.9  64.3 
QRES  433  13.2  24.3  0.0  159.0 
PHD  433  76.2%  42.6%  0  1 
PAAP  433  20.8%  40.6%  0  1 





Table 2: Randon effects’ FGLS estimates (*) 
  Dependent variable 
Explanatory variables  EVAL1  EVAL1  EVAL2 
Student's characteristics 
GRADE  0.088  0.075  0.036 
  (0.000)  (0.003)  (0.006) 
PRESP  0.000  0.000  -0.000 
  (0.737)  (0.904)  (0.858) 
PFEM  -0.001  -0.001  -0.001 
  (0.614)  (0.593)  (0.317) 
Courses' characteristics 
CSIZE  -0.003  -0.003  -0.001 
  (0.002)  (0.001)  (0.085) 
MAND  0.062  0.060  0.004 
  (0.399)  (0.414)  (0.914) 
BUS  0.047  0.055  0.034 
  (0.616)  (0.555)  (0.484) 
JOINT  0.149  0.158  0.052 
  (0.066)  (0.049)  (0.174) 
Instructors' characteristics 
GENDER  0.060  0.068  0.038 
  (0.414)  (0.343)  (0.346) 
FULL  -0.063  -0.025  -0.027 
  (0.388)  (0.716)  (0.457) 
EXP  0.030  0.083  0.058 
  (0.025)  (0.002)  (0.000) 
EXP2    -0.005  -0.004 
    (0.010)  (0.003) 
AGE  0.000  0.002  0.000 
  (0.979)  (0.664)  (0.976) 
QRES  0.001  0.001  0.001 
  (0.082)  (0.081)  (0.047) 
PHD  -0.006  -0.043  -0.010 
  (0.939)  (0.540)  (0.800) 
PAAP  -0.034  -0.004  -0.036 
  (0.604)  (0.957)  (0.344) 
CPCL  -0.011  -0.012  -0.041 
  (0.859)  (0.839)  (0.213) 
Number of obs.  363  363  363 
Wald chi2 (d.f.)  89.43  93.42  57.64 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
R2 overall  0.157  0.205  0.208 
(*)  The  equations  include  time  dummies  for  each  semester 
between 2
nd semester of 2005 until 1
st semester of 2008. P-
values based on White robust standard-errors in parentheses.  18 
 
Table 4: Adjusted rankings: estimates and 95% confidence intervals 
Ranking 2:  








I 3  3.52  3.64  3.76 
I 2  3.45  3.64  3.82 
I 1  3.49  3.62  3.76 
I 4  3.45  3.62  3.79 
I 5  3.42  3.60  3.79 
I 6  3.45  3.58  3.71 
I 9  3.38  3.52  3.65 
I 7  3.35  3.51  3.68 
I 11  3.35  3.50  3.66 
I 8  3.30  3.49  3.68 
I 12  3.32  3.47  3.62 
I 10  3.20  3.45  3.69 
I 13  3.31  3.45  3.58 
I 16  3.27  3.44  3.60 
I 17  3.32  3.43  3.54 
I 21  3.32  3.42  3.53 
I 18  3.31  3.42  3.54 
I 20  3.26  3.42  3.59 
I 14  3.23  3.42  3.62 
I 15  3.24  3.41  3.59 
I 22  3.21  3.40  3.59 
I 19  3.25  3.40  3.54 
I 23  3.28  3.39  3.51 
I 26  3.24  3.38  3.53 
I 24  3.22  3.38  3.55 
I 29  3.24  3.38  3.52 
I 28  3.20  3.38  3.55 
I 25  3.18  3.36  3.54 
I 27  3.21  3.36  3.50 
I 30  3.20  3.36  3.51 
I 34  3.18  3.35  3.52 
I 31  3.15  3.34  3.53 
I 32  3.21  3.34  3.46 
I 35  3.20  3.33  3.47 
I 36  3.18  3.33  3.48 
I 33  3.17  3.33  3.49 
I 38  3.20  3.32  3.44 
I 39  3.19  3.32  3.45 
I 40  3.18  3.30  3.42 
I 43  3.18  3.29  3.41 
I 41  3.15  3.29  3.44 
I 37  3.11  3.29  3.47 
I 42  3.12  3.28  3.45 
I 44  3.03  3.24  3.45 
I 45  3.06  3.24  3.41 
I 46  3.09  3.23  3.36 
I 49  3.05  3.21  3.37 
I 48  3.08  3.21  3.34 
I 47  3.04  3.20  3.36 19 
 
Ranking 2:  








I 50  3.05  3.19  3.34 
I 51  3.04  3.18  3.33 
I 59  2.91  3.18  3.46 
I 52  3.08  3.18  3.29 
I 54  3.02  3.18  3.33 
I 53  2.95  3.15  3.36 
I 56  2.99  3.15  3.32 
I 55  2.98  3.14  3.30 
I 57  2.92  3.12  3.33 
I 58  2.94  3.10  3.26 
I 60  2.91  3.08  3.25 
I 61  2.79  3.06  3.32 
I 62  2.84  3.04  3.24 
I 64  2.84  3.01  3.19 
I 63  2.81  3.00  3.20 
I 65  2.83  2.99  3.15 
I 66  2.80  2.96  3.11 
I 67  2.68  2.88  3.07 
I 68  2.69  2.86  3.04 




Ranking 3:  








I1  3.54  3.68  3.82 
I3  3.53  3.66  3.79 
I2  3.42  3.61  3.80 
I4  3.42  3.59  3.76 
I5  3.39  3.58  3.78 
I6  3.43  3.57  3.71 
I7  3.42  3.56  3.71 
I8  3.37  3.56  3.74 
I12  3.41  3.55  3.69 
I9  3.35  3.49  3.62 
I14  3.27  3.46  3.66 
I19  3.29  3.45  3.62 
I11  3.27  3.45  3.63 
I25  3.25  3.45  3.64 
I28  3.28  3.45  3.61 
I10  3.19  3.44  3.69 
I13  3.31  3.44  3.58 
I18  3.32  3.44  3.56 
I29  3.28  3.43  3.58 
I26  3.26  3.42  3.58 
I31  3.22  3.42  3.62 
I17  3.30  3.42  3.54 20 
 
Ranking 3:  








I16  3.23  3.41  3.59 
I21  3.28  3.40  3.53 
I37  3.26  3.40  3.55 
I15  3.22  3.40  3.58 
I20  3.18  3.38  3.58 
I41  3.24  3.38  3.52 
I22  3.18  3.38  3.58 
I23  3.25  3.38  3.50 
I24  3.20  3.36  3.53 
I27  3.20  3.35  3.50 
I35  3.20  3.34  3.49 
I30  3.16  3.34  3.51 
I36  3.18  3.34  3.50 
I33  3.14  3.32  3.50 
I32  3.18  3.32  3.45 
I40  3.18  3.31  3.45 
I42  3.12  3.31  3.50 
I46  3.17  3.31  3.44 
I38  3.17  3.31  3.44 
I39  3.17  3.30  3.43 
I45  3.09  3.28  3.48 
I43  3.16  3.28  3.40 
I44  3.07  3.26  3.46 
I53  3.11  3.26  3.41 
I50  3.11  3.26  3.40 
I56  3.10  3.24  3.39 
I54  3.06  3.23  3.40 
I48  3.08  3.22  3.36 
I49  3.02  3.19  3.37 
I51  3.05  3.19  3.34 
I47  3.02  3.19  3.36 
I58  3.02  3.19  3.36 
I55  3.00  3.17  3.35 
I52  3.06  3.17  3.28 
I34  3.01  3.17  3.33 
I57  2.98  3.17  3.36 
I61  2.93  3.15  3.37 
I60  2.91  3.09  3.26 
I64  2.87  3.04  3.21 
I65  2.88  3.04  3.20 
I66  2.88  3.03  3.18 
I63  2.81  3.01  3.21 
I62  2.77  2.99  3.21 
I67  2.74  2.92  3.11 
I68  2.73  2.92  3.11 
I59  2.36  2.88  3.40 
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